Clash of Cultures and Navies in the Pacific Theatre Part 1: Pearl Harbour to Midway
Essex Class carrier USS Franklin surviving a direct hit from a Japanese dive bomber.
War has long been portrayed as the fiery crucible in which real men are forged, revealing the true virtues and vices of every civilisation. The decision to go to war and how a nation conducts a war has many factors, one of which, culture, has been too often ignored.
Every culture is unique; however, some are more approximate to one another than others. The cultural gap between America and Canada or America and the United Kingdom was negligible in relation to the cultural differences between America and Japan. The Japanese Empire in the 1930s and 1940s can be very difficult to understand.
This lack of understanding was naturally not a one-way relationship. The Japanese Empire in 1941 made a series of assumptions, errors and miscalculations about the West, when they embarked on a campaign for pacific domination.
Japan was utterly convinced, mainly inspired by a similar British carrier strike on the Italian fleet in Taranto 1940, that they could launch a decisive surprise attack on the American Pacific fleet forward operating base in Pearl Harbour Hawaii. The Japanese theorised that this strike would result in the US suing for peace or worst-case scenario provide them with enough time to create an impenetrable sphere of influence stretching from the Indian subcontinent to New Zealand.
Overconfident Russian satirical cartoon 1904
They saw America‘s hitherto neutrality as a sign of weakness which typified her national character. Japan was on the rise and felt near invincible. The past five decades had seen Japan ascend from a feudal society to a modern world Superpower. Ancient Greek historian Thucydides writing on the Peloponnesian Wars between Sparta and Athens made the claim that there would always be an inevitable violent conflict between a declining dominat power and a rising aspiring power.
The world, particularly the West had made the mistake of underestimating Japan. In 1904 Japan, seeking to expand its imperial gains in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula launched a surprise attack on Tsarist Russia. To the shock of the whole world it was a resounding success.
The Russian Navy in Port Arthur was taken off guard and defeated in detail as the Russian Baltic fleet was thousands of miles away (note: defeat in detail refers to a tactic of destroying an overall numerical superior enemy by dividing it and engaging it in smaller manageable units). The poorly disciplined, ill-equipped and demoralised Russian ground forces were then defeated in the battle of Mukden (until that point the largest land battle in history).
The Japanese had learned many lessons from this war, that would later inform their strategy in the First but more importantly the Second World War. Firstly, that the element of surprise was paramount to achieving success, secondly, that geographical distance between it and the European Homelands was an advantage that could be exploited, thirdly, the importance of intensely coordinated planning and training, fourthly, that sheer will to win would lead to victory and fifthly, that European powers were not invincible, furthermore that their arrogance was one of their prime weaknesses.
Japanese Art depicting the sinking of the Russian Fleet at the Battle Tsushima, May 1905.
However, in 1941 the Japanese didn’t realise that the Americans would be no pushovers like the Russian in 1904, or the Germans in 1914, on whom they utilised the same strategy without difficulty. Americans, unlike Russians and Germans had no experience of losing wars and even a cursory glance at US history will demonstrate that they don’t back down from a fight.
Considering the fact that Americans were more than willing to cross the Atlantic in 1801 to crush the Barbary states for acts of piracy, taking the decision to bomb their main war fleet was certain to lead to war. Despite the teleological nature of such conclusions (hindsight is always 20/20), it is peculiar that Japan thought the same tactics could be used against the Americans, and even more peculiar that the Americans, while not oblivious to the potential danger, were caught off guard when it really mattered.
The Americans saw the attack as extremely underhanded. US president at the time Franklin D. Roosevelt famously described it as a day “which will live in infamy”. Just as in 1904, Japan only informed its enemy of its declaration of war after the attack. Adding insult to injury, the attack came as the Japanese Empire had been participating in negotiations with the US on their withdrawal from Indochina and the removal of the US trade embargo.
The USS West Virginia struck by six torpedoes and two bombs during the attack on Pearl Harbour 7th December 1941.
It was certainly surprising for a culture like that of Japan’s, which places such a high emphasis on honour, to resort to such ignoble tactics. The US however was not completely blind to the growing Japanese threat, in fact by July 1941 she enacted an oil embargo on Japan and the repositioned her pacific fleet from San Diego California to Pearl Harbour Hawaii.
Japanese war industry required vast quantities of imported oil and other resources. Japan saw herself a being cornered, left with a dilemma, either back down and seek diplomatic reconciliation or accept the challenge and strike while she still could. Her honour being challenged, she chose the latter.
Critical to any chance of success would be the destruction of the US pacific fleet and should the Americans decide to fight on (a possibility which they saw as uncertain), create enough of a buffer zone (composing of a string of pacific Islands thousands of kilometres from the Japanese homeland), that it could extract the minerals needed to fend off the new fleet which America would no doubt construct in the interim period. This gap of opportunity, in which Japan could act almost unchallenged in the western Pacific, was described by Japanese Admiral Yamamoto as the “six months to run wild”.
US Coast Guard recruitment poster 1942
On that fateful day of 7th December 1941, due to strict radio silence and a poorly integrated US early warning radar system, the Japanese achieved total surprise for their Pearl Harbour attack. However, the US carrier fleet was not at port but rather at sea. The Japanese therefore only managed to sink a few obsolete inter-war era battle ships like the USS West Virginia and USS Arizona. The Arizona suffered a direct hit to her magazine and exploded instantly, killing over 1,177 men (making up half of all men killed on the day).
The USS West Virginia however despite suffering six torpedo and two bomb hits, only partially sank in very shallow water, allowing her it be later recovered, repaired and modernised. This was the case for six out of the eight sunk battleships, which were returned to service in an astonishing three months.
These interwar battleships were much more symbolic targets than practical. More appropriate targets would have been the oil and diesel storage facilities, submarine dockyards and US Pacific Naval command HQ buildings. The destruction of the battleships however was an attempt to deliver a physiological blow to their enemy and intimidate them into submission.
1942 poster from US Office of War Information
In hindsight one could easily conclude that the raid was a strategic blunder. It gave the Americans a perfect Casus Belli (thus helping gain support for the war effort), failed to attack the any aircraft carrier and only permanently sunk two battleships (USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma).
However even if the attack had somehow been a success, permanently destroying all American battleships and aircraft carriers, the odds of Japan winning a prolonged war were slim. They banked on America not fighting. To their horror slogans like “Remember Pearl Harbour” and “"Avenge Pearl Harbour” sung out from across the ocean and the sleeping giant of US war industry roared to life.
1942 US Navy recruitment poster by Barclay McClelland
The next day, December 8th, 1941 the US declared war. The first demonstration of real intent to fight on came in April when 15 American B-25 bombers took flight from the USS Hornet to bomb the Japanese home Islands in a symbolic act of daring defiance.
In the meantime US industry was getting into motion. In the first year of the war the US had built 85 destroyers to the Japanese 10, 11 escort carriers to the Japanese 2, 36 submarines to the Japanese 20.
The greatest disparity was in destroyers (the overlooked workhorse of any navy) and aircraft carriers. By the end of 1943 the US had produced 447 destroyers and destroyer escorts to a mere 37 produced by the Japanese Empire and they constructed 51 aircraft carriers of various sizes (mostly smaller escort carriers) versus the Japanese 7.
These production figures for 1942 and 1943 in the opening phase of the war already spelt a Japanese downfall. The Japanese would have to destroy American vessels at a rate of 8 to 1 to have a fighting chance.
B-25s on USS Hornet for Doolittle Raid April 1942
However, one should not fall into the trap of economic determinism. Smaller and poorer equipped forces have often defeated larger ones in the history of war, the Boer war being a good example. Skill and daring could often decide victory. The Japanese had their best opportunity to win early on in the war and as time progressed, their chances diminished.
America however would soon prove that in an equal fight she could not only hold her weight, but then some. Three examples of American skill and daring, on equal odds or worse, stand out from the war, namely that of the USS Yorktown at the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway, USS Johnston at the Battle of Samar and the USS O’Bannon in its anti-submarine patrol of April 1943.
HMS Repulse in July 1938 in The Holy Land
Directly after Pearl Harbour and the Japanese sinking of the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse (10th December 1941), the Japanese had the initiative in the Pacific.
Their fleet slightly outnumbered the Americans in the region. However, Japan limited by her less impressive industrial capacity pursued a policy of quality over quantity. At this point in the war they had the best trained and largest naval aviation strike force in the world. To achieve victory they would need to provoke a decisive engagement in which the remainder of the US pacific fleet could be eliminated.
In their planning they made more miscalculations of American culture. They thought that the Americans would rather avoid engagements until they could amass a larger force, an idea that the easy conquering of the American Philippians had seemed to confirm. Thinking that the Americans would be battle shy, the Japanese sought to attack a target that they could not ignore, Midway island.
US civil service commission recruitment poster
The Americans for their part knew full well that Japan would exploit their forward momentum and bring the fight to them. American logistics, electronics and code breaking was superior to the Japanese. They intercepted intel that the next strike would be on Midway in the first week of June 1942. Admiral Nimitz of the US sought to ambush the ambushers.
Instead of focusing on being omnipresent on the high seas, Japanese strategy was to formulate an elite quality strike force of super ships like the Yamato class super-battleship and the world’s first purpose-built aircraft carriers like the Hōshō and the more modern behemoths of the Akagi, Kaga and Sōryū class carriers. Together this strike force would be known as the “Kido Butai“.
The Japanese went into the battle with high morale, four carries to their enemies three. Nimitz however felt equally confident, knowing where and when the Japanese would attack. Having naval bombers on midway Island, he felt it was four carriers against four.
Japanese Mitsubishi a6m Zero aircraft preparing to launch from the carrier Akagi
The Americans at the battle of the Coral Sea (the first naval battle in history where both sides warships never saw one another) had sunk a Japanese carrier and damaged another. The Japanese thought that they had sunk two Americans carriers, the USS Yorktown and USS Lexington. Little did they knew that the Americans had, despites the odds, managed to salvage the Yorktown and made around the clock emergency repairs in a remarkable 48 hours.
So, on the day it would be over 350 Americans aircraft versus about 275 Japanese aircraft, a far cry from Japanese plans which foresaw their four aircraft carriers versus the American two.
Recruitment Poster for the US women’s naval auxiliary.
The Japanese sailed right into the American trap and launched their carrier aircraft to bomb Midway Island. The Americans at that stage already had their bombers in the air searching for the precise location of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters and Aichi D3A dive bombers attacked Midway but the airwing commander believed that a second airstrike would be needed to make the Islands runway unusable.
The commander of the Japanese strike force Admiral Nagumo decided to have his aircraft refueled and rearmed with high explosive bombs, a process that would take about 45 minutes. While this process was underway, a report came in that the American fleet had been sighted.
Japanese naval doctrine focused on intense planning, but this was also its greatest weakness. Such reliance on detailed planning led to a form of tactical rigidity, unable to adapt to unexpected developments on the battlefield.
Nagumo, shocked that the enemy fleet was not where it was supposed to be, asked the Japanese scout aircraft to report the class types of the spotted American surface fleet. In a critical delay the scout reported back that the enemy fleet contained three aircraft carriers.
Japanese propaganda art encouraging surrender dropped on front lines of British and Australian troops
Nagumo was now left with a dilemma, either rescind his previous order, rearming the aircraft with torpedoes, and armor piercing bombs, waiting for all his planes to land and send a unified strike or send them as they were armed in isolated waves. Nagumo hesitated from making a decision and in that critical moment three small waves of American Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers attacked the Japanese fleet.
The superior Japanese fighter air cover torn the American attack waves to pieces, hwoever in the confusion the Japanese fleet was propelled into chaos as flak AA filled the sky and capital ships made sharp emergency evasive turns to dodge incoming torpedoes and rapidly descending bombs.
The Japanese carriers needed to sail into the wind to provide their aircraft with the necessary lift to take flight, in this chaos no aircraft could be sent in a counterattack on the US fleet. To add to Nagumo’s problems the remaining returning bombers from their Midway raid needed to land. The American attacks kept coming in relentless successive attacks. These outdated slow and unmaneuverable American aircraft were easy prey for the Japanese fighters and AA, but despite a 90% casualty rate they kept coming, thus denying the Japanese use of their powerful aircraft carriers.
40mm AA Bofors firing from Aircraft Carrier USS Hornet
Eventually the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters ran out of ammunition and fuel, needing to land on the crammed Japanese deck space or ditch into the ocean. Even though the Americans had sustained high casualties in contrast to the relatively low casualties of the Japanese, they played an indispensable role in stalling the enemy fleet.
The Japanese carriers were turned into one massive powder keg. With the re-arming process underway, discarded high explosive bombs, fuel and aircraft filled the hanger and deck space and with no more fighter air cover, the recently repaired USS Yorktown would deliver the knockout blow.
A significant strike wing from the Yorktown and the USS Enterprise would arrive at the perfect moment, in less than six minutes the American planes successfully hit three of the four Japanese carriers. In each case there was a small explosion from their ordinance, followed by a gigantic secondary explosion from the fuel and bombs igniting in the resulting fire.
USS Yorktown at the Battle of Midway
Nagumo only realized too late what had happened. The barely afloat USS Yorktown, having narrowly escaped the Battel of the Coral Sea one month earlier, and presumed sunk by the Japanese, had come back from the death to reign destruction on the Kido Butai and change the balance of power in the Pacific Theater.
The battle waged on and the brave and battered Yorktown exchanged blows once more with the remaining Japanese carrier Hiryū, both being sunk in the process. The crew of the Yorktown were once more repairing the damage inflicted from aerial bombs and torpedoes when a Japanese submarine launched four torpedoes, two of which made contact with the ship. She was evacuated in an orderly manner, losing about only 400 of her 2,200 crew.
American code breaking, persistence in relentless attacks despite initial high causalities and superior damage control measures had won the day and perhaps even the war.
Niall Buckley
July 2020