Germany and Austria-Hungary, a children’s tale.
Best of friends or an alliance of convenience. The truth behind the relationship between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary has long been debated. Ever since the “German Question” was resolved with Bismarck’s “Kleindeutschland” (small Germany) solution from the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, there has been a German state project distinct from Austria.
Bismarck wanted the various small states of the Deutscher Bund under Prussian control. For centuries previous, the main obstacle to German unity was the bi-polar power dynamic between Austria, representing the Catholic south and Prussia, representing the Lutheran north.
Since the days of Frederick of Prussia and Maria Theresa of Austria, the two have been waging war to see which state should lead the German world. German nationalism (the idea of a united state for all Germans), gets its first spark with the Napoleonic wars. United with their common opposition to the French, German speakers saw how national unity had contributed to France's might. Then the rise of the bourgeois middle classes saw the economic opportunity that could be realised by a greater unified economy without endless customs points and differing red tape from town to town.
Bismarck seeking to unify the German states under his leadership provoked a massive pan-German civil war, defeating the Austrians and Saxons at the battle of Königgrätz 1866. Then he went about provoking a war with the French to solidify his total control over the German states. This culminated with the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 from the palace of Versailles near Paris.
After this success, his policies shifted. He did not seek the total destruction of Austria. Instead he supported the new 1867 Ausgleich forming Austria-Hungary. Together with a stable Austria-Hungary and an alliance with Russia, the existence of the new Germany would be guaranteed.
However the Iron chancellor’s plans were hindered by the poor relationship between Austria and Russia, stemming from Austria’s failure to support the Tsar in the Crimean war in 1853 against the British and the French. In addition Bismarck over time was sidelined by the new Kaiser Wilhelm II who wanted to assert his own authority within the new Germany and expand German influence internationally, thus putting him in opposition once more to France and Britain. Britain bore no ill will towards Germany, unlike France, but was becoming disgruntled by the rapidly shifting balance of power in Europe. Wilhelm’s desire to build a war fleet to rival the British (as unrealistic as it was) certainly didn’t help.
By 1912 Germany gave up this ambition but it was too late, the damage was done. Austria’s position in the Balkans was vulnerable due to the recent nationalist uprisings against the retreating Ottoman Empire. Russia was keen to assert itself after recent defeats against the Japanese, a non-European power, thus a serious blow to her prestige. France was keen to reacquire Alsace-Lorraine and was encouraging Russian expansionist dreams. The British for their part had committed to war even before the question of Belgium’s sovereignty had provided an ideal pretext to enter a world war. The Italians, never fully committing to their triple alliance with Germany and Austria, weighed up their odds and were slowly distancing themselves from their “de jure” allies, hoping to take a slice out of Alpine and Adriatic Austria.
Austria and Germany had no friends besides each other. Half of Europe was keen on the partition of Austria-Hungary along national lines. Europe's last composite monarchy was left no option but to throw itself into the hands of the German Kaiser.
Making the most of a bad situation, the old world Emperor of Austria, Franz Josef, accepted the new status quo. After all his dynasty had lasted for almost a millennium and seen darker days. Having been defeated in 1848, Pan-German nationalists organised themselves in 1882 to adopt the Linz Program, committing themselves to the political union of all Germans. This marks a rejection of the multi-ethnic makeup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in favour of ethnic homogeneity. These Pan-Germans were the driving force of closer economic and military ties between the Empire and Germany.
With the rising tide of nationalism in Europe, Austrians, seeing themselves too as Germans, had to overcome their inherited opposition to Prussian militarism and hitch their destiny to their modern neighbour to the north. Germany was many things to many people in Austria. To anti-clerical liberals like von Schönerer it was a progress paradise free from the influence of the Catholic Church for socialists like Adler it was an industrial land with much more opportunity for Marxist class struggle. For the old Catholic Monarchist elite like Karl Lueger or Gyula Andrassy, Germany was a valuable ally in securing the stability of the realm against internal uprisings or external invasion. Thus a brotherly alliance was born.
Many looking at the outbreak of WW1 might well see it as a schoolyard quarrel that escalated into an outright fight. A series of alliances not dissimilar to school gangs or lunch tables, all vying for prestige and popularity.
The alliance bore fruit in 1914 with Germany supporting their brother Austria in the south in its effort to push back against Serbian efforts to undermine territorial integrity. The July crisis of 1914 saw Germany refuse to back down or abandon Austria to the will of Tsarist Russia, and with an entanglement of alliances the regional conflict soon escalated to a world war.
Throughout the early phase of the war the two powers worked side by side mostly as equals. Yet anyone could do the math, the power of the german economy and the loyalty of its subjects (suffering from no major internal divisions, unlike Austria-Hungary) made Germany the dominant power/driving force of the relationship.
However the loss of Przemyśl Fortress in March 1915 saw the German general staff take operational control of Austrian forces on the eastern front. This support also extended to the new Romanian and Italian fronts where German and Austrian forces worked side by side. The support was not however only one way. Austrian heavy Skoda artillery was sent to the western front to combat the impressive french Verdun fortification system.
As the war dragged on their relationship was strained. The death of the Austrian Kaiser Franz Josef in 1916, saw Kaiser Charles of Austria (who would later be beatified by Pope John Paul II in 2004) inherit the throne. Charles was in favour of reorganising Austria-Hungary to give more representation to the Slavic population and was in favour of an honourable peace with the Entente. Inspired by Pope Benedict XV’s 1917 peace plan, he started a secret correspondence with his enemies. The Pope’s peace plan was viewed favourably by Austria and Great Britain but Germany and the USA were not so enthusiastic. The plan ultimately failed when it was undermined by Woodrow Wilson’s strong opposition.
The low point of German-Austrian relations came when Kaiser Charles’s secret correspondence to attain a separate peace was leaked by the French. The USA was fixated with redrawing Europe along nationalist lines, and therefore the utter eradication of the composite monarchy of Austria-Hungary. From 1918 on, it was apparent that Austria would be in a position of subservience to Germany and should the central powers lose the war, Habsburg Austria as she understood herself, would be erased from the European map.
Like many friendships, one only knows its strength when put to the test. War is the ultimate test of a civilization’s values and it’s will to exist. Austria understandably put its continued existence ahead of an alliance with a Prussian elite that had embraced the idea of war as fundamentally healthy for the growth of a society.
Prussia perhaps had always viewed Austria as a convenient buffer zone to shield it from being geopolitically and militarily outflanked. Perhaps the old north-south tension had never truly gone away. Perhaps behind all the cartoons, there was no one in Germany, just a bellicose Prussian Junker class using war as a means to maintain its grip on the small German states of central Europe, supporting Austria when advantageous and undermining it when opportunity arose. Whether Zweibund, Dreibund or Mittelmächte, maybe not all that much changed from Königgrätz to Sarajevo.
Niall Buckley
February 2020